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‘Going Out’ or Staying In? The Expansion of Chinese NGOs in Africa* 
 
Jennifer Hsu, University of Alberta 
Timothy Hildebrandt, London School of Economics and Political Science 
Reza Hasmath, University of Oxford 
 
 
Abstract: Growing attention has been paid to China’s recent entree into international 
development. While received wisdom has long suggested that NGOs have played key roles in 
assisting government-led development initiatives, little scholarly attention has been paid to 
the potential for Chinese non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in helping affect these 
process and outcomes. In this article, we examine two African nations – Ethiopia and Malawi 
– with high levels of Chinese development assistance, but with contrasting political regime 
types. Our findings indicate that irrespective of regime type, Chinese NGOs are yet to make a 
substantial impact in either nation. We argue that, despite the strength of the Chinese state 
and high levels of international development assistance given, domestic politics and 
regulatory frameworks in host nations still matter a great deal. These local contexts 
ultimately have constrained Chinese development work, especially in regards to the 
involvement of NGOs. Furthermore, the implications of our study suggest that the Chinese 
model of international development will continue to be one where temporary one-off projects 
are favoured; and, insofar as social organisations will play a role, they will be in the domain 
of government-organised, non-governmental organisations (GONGOs) than grassroots 
NGOs. 
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Introduction 
 
 The expansion of China’s overseas development assistance has mirrored the growth of its 
state-run commercial investments – as embodied in the 10th Five Year Plan (2001-2005) “Going 
Out” (zou chu qu) policy. Much of China’s overseas development assistance (ODA) is directed 
at nations where China has a substantial stake in the natural resources sector, most notably in 
Africa. Unlike the dominant practice of Western donors, Chinese assistance is provided largely 
in the form of concessional or low-interest loans, and government-financed or government-
subsidised infrastructure projects.  
 However, these activities are not exclusively in the domain of the state. NGOs have 
traditionally played an important role in the development outcomes of a recipient nation. 
Harnessing a range of resources and power, including material, symbolic, interpretive and 
geographical power (Hasmath and Hsu 2014), NGOS are characterised by many scholars as 
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providing social welfare and capacity-building functions (see Andrews 2014; Banks et al. 2015; 
Batley and Rose 2011; Brysk 2000; Scholte 1999).  
 In fact, domestically, China’s NGO sector has played a growing role in the nation’s own 
development, evident by their rising number – totalling over 546,000 registered social 
organisations (MoCA 2013). Literature analysing the behaviour of Chinese NGOs has sought to 
focus attention on the rise and development of the sector (Deng and Shieh 2011; Hasmath and 
Hsu 2009; Hildebrandt 2013; Hsu 2012a, 2012b; Kaufman 2012). Due to the dominance of the 
state, and tight regulatory supervision of social organisations, the growth of NGOs has not been 
easy; and, the nature of NGO development and maturation might look different here than in other 
contexts (see Hasmath and Hsu 2015a; Hsu and Hasmath 2013, 2014; Kang and Heng 2008; Wu 
and Chan 2012). Put differently, how Chinese NGOs operate overseas can potentially be shaped 
by their domestic upbringing, and thus, analytical queries about their behaviour, actions and 
practices in a new jurisdiction are all pertinent to analysing the opportunities and constraints 
Chinese NGOs face in conducting development in their host nation.  
 In this article, we examine two jurisdictions in Africa – Ethiopia and Malawi –with high 
levels of Chinese development assistance, but with contrasting political regime types. Drawing 
upon the extensive literature on the Chinese NGOs that suggests a rising presence in the 
domestic sphere, as well as the well-documented role that NGOs have played in official 
development assistance globally, we expect Chinese social organisations to follow the lead of the 
government’s ‘Going Out’ development policies. However, our findings indicate that 
irrespective of political regime type, Chinese NGOs are yet to make a substantial impact in either 
nation. They have, on the whole, stayed in, rather than gone out. We argue that, despite the 
strength of the Chinese state and high levels of international development assistance, domestic 
politics and regulatory frameworks in host jurisdictions matter a great deal. These local contexts 
ultimately have constrained Chinese development work, especially in regards to the involvement 
of NGOs.  
 The article proceeds as follows: after rationalising our case study selection and discussing 
our methods, we briefly outline the role of NGOs in development more broadly and then 
contextualise our research by looking specifically at Chinese NGOs as development actors. In 
the two sections thereafter we explore why Chinese NGOs do not operate at a level expected in 
each jurisdiction, analysing the myriad domestic constraints and highlighting, in particular, the 
role of regulatory frameworks. Finally, we explore the implications for the future NGO 
involvement in official Chinese ODA and theorise how Chinese NGOs might follow in the 
footsteps of their Western counterparts.  
 
Case Study Selection and Methodology 
 
 Our study looks at two African nations: Ethiopia and Malawi. In both jurisdictions, Chinese 
investment is significant relative to the size of their economy and population. Further, the two 
cases were chosen to capture dichotomous political regime types. We hypothesised that political 
regime type might have a strong effect on general openness for civil society organisations, and 
specifically the ability for Chinese NGOs to engage in development projects. Ethiopia is a “one-
party democracy” – in actuality, semi-authoritarian with a Polity score of -3 (2013) – with the 
People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front ruling since 1991; and, in the 2015 elections capturing 
virtually all electoral seats. Unlike the behaviour of many Western donors, China has not treated 
Ethiopia as only an aid recipient – since 2000, there have been 111 official projects funded, 
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totalling approximately USD 8.73 billion – but also a strategic partner and ally (China Aid Data 
2015). Malawi is a young democratic, multi-party government system, with the current 
constitution intact since the mid-1990s; it boasts a Polity score of 6 (2013). Since 2007, China 
has funded an estimated 32 official projects – with initiatives ranging from education, water 
supply and sanitation, energy generation, agriculture, social infrastructure – totalling 
approximately USD 430 million (China Aid Data 2015). 
 The fieldwork is based upon elite interviews (see Hochschild 2009) that occurred in two 
simultaneous phases in the summer of 2014. In one phase, we conducted semi-structured 
interviews with NGO representatives, Chinese officials, and local government officials in 
Malawi and Ethiopia. In another phase, we conducted semi-structured interviews with Chinese 
NGOs and semi-autonomous government entities, in Mandarin, who have operations with the 
two case study nations. These interviews occurred in Beijing – the location for the headquarters 
of the Chinese NGOs operating overseas under study – to understand the organisational 
strategies and practices to be employed for “going out”. Eighteen elite interviews in total were 
conducted – nine in Addis Ababa, six in Lilongwe, and seven in Beijing.  
 
The Role of Chinese NGOs in Development 
 
 In this section we give a broad sketch of NGOs in development, honing in on the specifics of 
the Chinese case. Most scholars and activists agree that the work of many NGOs is vital to 
communities around the world. As both advocates and service providers, NGOs are credited for 
bringing an array of important issues like, climate change, poverty reduction, gender inequality 
and public health to the attention of the public, and onto the agenda of national governments. 
Despite their potential and successes, NGOs across the world have had to contend with issues 
and questions of representativeness, accountability and legitimacy given they are not elected by 
the constituents in whom they seek to represent (see Hasmath and Hsu 2008). In this context, 
NGOs are closely watched in nations like China, where there are significant attempts on the part 
of the state to monitor and regulate their development and movements.  
 Nonetheless, NGOs in China are emerging as important stakeholders in the delivery of social 
services, in part, incentivised by the state’s move towards a procurement model (Hasmath and 
Hsu 2015b). As NGOs are pushed into the service delivery role, the institutional constraints have 
not necessarily lessened for NGOs (see Hasmath and Hsu 2014). While NGOs are increasingly 
able to register without a government sponsoring unit, such regulations only apply to a handful 
of NGOs working in a few pre-approved categories (see Hildebrandt 2011; Tam and Hasmath 
2015). Still, Chinese NGOs have expanded and made an impact on a number of important 
sectors including migrant welfare, HIV/AIDS, environment and other issues that do not receive 
proper attention by the state (see Hsu 2014). As local levels of the state are tasked with the 
responsibility of welfare delivery, the increasingly cash-strapped local authorities across China 
will likely shift the burden to individuals, households, and other non-state actors. Such a 
situation may be seen as both an opportunity for NGOs to increase their presence, but given the 
institutional challenges such as lack of funding, regulatory constraints and inadequate 
organisational capacity, NGOs may not be in a position to satisfactorily carry out the necessary 
social services (Hasmath and Hsu 2014, 2015a; Hsu and Hasmath 2015).  
 As they mature, Chinese NGOs are looking beyond their local communities; indeed, they are 
even casting their gaze across national borders. Within the broader framework of China’s “Going 
Out” policy, Chinese NGOs are starting to impress their presence abroad. According to Liu 
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Hongwu, director of the Institute of African Studies at Zhejiang Normal University, there are 
some 100 Chinese NGOs working in Africa (quoted in Meng and Sun 2013). The likes of 
China’s national Red Cross and China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation (CFPA) are amongst 
the organisations with projects in Africa.  
 One important caveat to note in this optimistic assessment of 100 NGOs abroad is the fact 
that the vast majority are government-organised, non-governmental organisations (GONGOs). 
GONGOs intimate and intertwined connection with the state can make them qualitatively 
different from NGOs. In the Chinese context, the major GONGOs, such as the All-China 
Federation of Trade Unions and the Communist Youth League of China, emerged during the 
Maoist era. They were effectively constructs of the state, and acted as “transmission belts” 
between the Party and the people (Hsu, unpublished). In terms of social development work, 
GONGOs like the CFPA or the Soong Ching Ling Foundation were initially led by individuals 
with previous Party positions; and, personnel and finances were often not fully independent from 
their relevant government ministries at foundation. For instance, since the CFPA’s organisational 
reform in 1999, personnel and finances are now separated from the government, with the 
ministry’s organizational control of the CFPA existing only in name (He 2005).  
 In the case of China, the prevalence of GONGOs across the social realm and its overlap with 
the work of NGOs means that they must be accounted for in the process of social transformation. 
Our consideration of the role of GONGOs in Africa is thus necessary in this study due to the 
overlap between their work and that of NGOs. Furthermore, from the state’s perspective there is 
little meaningful differentiation between GONGOs and NGOs. In short, our usage of “NGO” is 
broad and all-encompassing, although we are mindful of potential analytical shortcoming and 
variances. 
 From the standpoint of Chinese state, Chinese NGOs are seen as facilitators of friendlier 
relations with African nations. As the Chinese Association for International Understanding notes, 
despite increasing exchanges between Chinese and African governments, many African NGOs 
are still without adequate infrastructure and capacity-building knowledge, and to that end the 
China Association for NGO Co-operation (CANGO) is an important organisation to assist in the 
promotion of knowledge and co-operation between Chinese and African NGOs. In line with the 
rise of Chinese investments in Africa, Chinese NGOs are seen by observers as way to soften 
China’s image abroad, and to an extent rectify some of the damages caused by Chinese 
investments. To put it more eloquently, Zadek (2013) writes: 
 
Chinese NGOs, working with African NGOs, can make a major difference in helping 
to avoid the sort of conflict that has taken place in the Zambian copper belt … Chinese 
NGOs can also help African communities hosting Chinese enterprises to talk 
effectively with both local managers and other China-based senior executives. 
 
Here, the role of Chinese NGOs is seen as supplementing the corporate social responsibilities of 
Chinese companies. Such perspectives suggest that Chinese NGOs have a limited role in actually 
promoting long-term development projects, independent of Chinese commercial interests. 
Chinese involvement in Sudan’s Merowe Dam project has also sparked discontent amongst local 
Sudanese, displaced by the project. Askouri (2008) notes, if China is to avoid local discontent as 
in the case of the Merowe Dam project, China needs to follow international standards of good 
practice and to achieve this to allow Chinese NGOs to engage with their African counterparts 
greater involvement in such projects.  
5 
 
 The push for Chinese for-profit and non-profit organisations to expand abroad has led to 
some undesirable consequences as noted above. To mitigate this, the Chinese state has sought to 
translate the notion of “harmonious society” into “harmonious world”. Bosshard (2008) believes 
that as Chinese companies continue to engage in environmentally and socially vulnerable 
sectors, they will increasingly have an interest in working with civil society groups that can help 
identify and resolve social and environmental problems, thus contributing to harmonious 
relations and development. 
 Nevertheless, the range of Chinese NGO activities, whether NGO or GONGO, have 
extended to areas such as agricultural training, drawing on China’s own development and 
agricultural experiences in the 1980s and early 1990s. Given the mandate to “go out” and a range 
of expertise developed within the last 25 years by Chinese NGOs and GONGOs in social 
development, there is potential for these organisations to make some impact in nations such as 
Ethiopia and Malawi.  
 There is also, to be sure, a real demand for both development assistance, and the expertise 
that NGOs can provide. Both Ethiopia and Malawi are one of the world’s poorest nations, and 
least developed, with a 2014 human development index of 0.434 and 0.414 respectively, well 
below the African average of 0.475. Despite our expectations and the rhetoric by Beijing, we did 
not find sustained Chinese NGOs activities in Ethiopia and Malawi. However, as we show in the 
following sections, future Chinese NGO activities in Ethiopia and Malawi will be shaped by the 
political and institutional context of the host nation. In Ethiopia, participation opportunities for 
Chinese NGOs may be more readily available due to the one-party government, whereas 
Malawi’s young liberal democracy may present more constraints.  
 
The Case of Ethiopia 
 
Regulatory Environment 
 
 The famines of 1973-1974 and 1984-1985 provided a platform for international NGOs to 
emerge and gain prominence through relief efforts. The conflict between the authoritarian rule of 
the Derg and rebel groups also shaped the NGO sector, with NGOs working in tacit (and 
sometimes overt) support of the government or its opposition. However, with the over-throw of 
Mengistu Haile Mariam in 1991, the Ethiopian NGO sector was propelled into chaos with little 
resources and capacity to make any significant impact. The new government under the Ethiopian 
People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front endeavoured to reform the sector, by insisting on less 
foreign dependence and greater sustainability of projects, as demarcated in the 1995 “Guidelines 
for NGO Operations”. As a consequence, the mid- to late-1990s witnessed an expansion of 
homegrown Ethiopian NGOs from 70 in 1994 to 368 in 2000 and 2775 in 2009 (Dupuy et al. 
2014). The 2005 elections marked a souring of relations between the state and NGO sector, 
where NGOs were accused of supporting opposition parties and the ensuing violence due to 
electoral disputes. A series of laws were promulgated following the election, including the 2009 
“Proclamation for the Registration and Regulation of Charities and Societies”, to tighten control 
and management of NGOs. While the Proclamation seeks to establish a regulatory framework for 
NGOs, it was more restrictive in nature, highlighted by the policy NGOs cannot receive more 
than 10% of their funding from foreign sources.
1
 In addition, only Ethiopian NGOs – those 
                                                 
1
 In the global context, restrictions placed on foreign NGOs operating in a host jurisdiction are not unique 
to a particular political regime type. For example, the Indian government in April 2015 blocked the 
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controlled and funded within Ethiopia – can advocate and work in the following areas: human 
and democratic rights, gender equality, rights of children and disabled persons, conflict 
resolution, and support to the judiciary.  
 As the vast majority of the Ethiopians population fall below the poverty line of 2 USD a day, 
the funding restrictions placed on NGOs means that it would be extremely challenging for 
Ethiopian NGOs to raise 90% of its finances domestically. Ironically, at odds with its own 
Proclamation, a quarter to one-third of the Ethiopian government’s budget comes from foreign 
aid (Yeshanew 2012: 373). The restriction on areas of operation for NGOs, stemming from the 
2009 Proclamation, demonstrate that the discourse on political and human rights remain in the 
realm and control of the state. Nevertheless, contemporary developments in the Ethiopian sector 
parallel the experience of Chinese NGOs, where the state is an active and strong participant in its 
development.  
 
Opportunities and Constraints  
 
 The belief that the Chinese and Ethiopian governments share an ideological affinity, coupled 
with substantial Chinese commercial engagements in Ethiopia, prompted the Ethiopian NGO 
representatives to observe the potential for Chinese NGOs to make an impact in their nation. The 
lack of Chinese social development assistance and collaboration with Ethiopian NGOs while not 
surprising – as most co-operation is at the governmental level – our respondents felt that there is 
much that can be transferred in terms of skills and knowledge. Our interviewees’ observations of 
Chinese workers across the numerous construction sites, coupled with rising investments made 
by Chinese companies and government, prompted an optimistic outlook on potential ‘positive’ 
behaviours and practices that can be imparted to Ethiopia. The Ethiopian country director of the 
National Alliance of State and Territorial AIDS Directors (NASTAD) noted that: “China has 
very good relations with the government; the capacity of the Chinese is going up, and they have 
provided good lessons to us in terms of ‘good work culture’” (Interview, June 2014). Looking at 
the extent of Chinese investments in Ethiopia, the Country Director of Hope International 
suggested that “perhaps the Chinese might bring in new concepts of entrepreneurship and 
investment to social development” (Interview, June 2014). These observations signify that 
Ethiopian NGO representatives associate “good” working culture in the for-profit sector with 
potential success in the non-profit sector. While none of the two NGOs are currently partnering 
with Chinese NGOs, both Directors believed that there was substantial room for knowledge and 
skill transfers. While our interviewees were aware of the negative press surrounding Chinese 
involvement on the continent, many were able to look beyond such reports and focus on the 
practicalities of the potential benefits of a partnership with Chinese NGOs.  
 In contrast to other African nations where there are substantial mineral resource deposits that 
are of interest to China, such as oil and copper, Ethiopia is a landlocked country with reserves of 
gold, platinum, tantalite, soda ash and phosphate rock. Unlikely to match the capacity of other 
African nations, the Ethiopian president Mulatu Teshome has emphasised that the bilateral 
relations between the two nations is predicated on mutual interests, common understanding and 
not on Chinese need for natural resources: “It’s not the raw materials that attract Chinese to 
Ethiopia. Rather, it is the mutual interests and benefits, mutual respect and common 
understanding we have. And it is going to be further strengthened” (quoted in Li 2014).  
                                                                                                                                                             
accounts of Greenpeace, accusing the NGO for tax violations, and threatening national economic interests 
(BBC 27 May 2015). 
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 The notion that there is mutual understanding between the two governments, translating to an 
ideal environment for Chinese NGOs to enter Ethiopia, is a recurring theme in the interviews. 
Unlike the case in Malawi, Ethiopia’s one party rule and political culture parallels that of China, 
thereby providing likely partnerships between the two social sectors. Accordingly, the time is 
ripe for this partnership since the “competition” between Western and Chinese development 
forces and Ethiopia is likely to benefit from the contest (Interview, June 2014). Moreover, given 
the concern the Ethiopian government has with Western organisations operating in Ethiopia, 
particularly with regards to their criticisms of the NGO regulation, Chinese NGOs are more 
likely to be welcomed by the Ethiopian authorities as they less likely to address controversial and 
sensitive issues. This “mutual understanding” is further stressed by a foreign NGO 
representative, who noted that both the Chinese and Ethiopian authorities understand each other 
in terms of state monopolies, authoritarianism, and a one-party system (Interview, June 2014). 
 Aside from the political affinities, NGO representatives while cautious of Chinese 
commercial involvement in China, are at the same time making plans to seek Chinese 
collaboration. The country director of NASTAD admits “we haven’t sought out Chinese funding 
yet, but it is something I am starting to think about.” Clearly, the potential for Ethiopian NGOs in 
partnering or having Chinese funding is exciting and potentially transformative, as noted by 
NASTAD’s director: “I am very eager to work with Chinese NGOS! And get Chinese funding!” 
The eagerness is also shared by the Country Director of Canadian Hunger Foundation (CHF): “I 
would have no problem to write grants soliciting their [Chinese] donation. At the end of the day, 
if I can have Chinese and Canadian donors work together to tackle gender violence, why not?” 
(Interview, June 2014). Here we see the desire mixed with a sense of pragmatism. The Director 
of Hope while enthusiastic at the possibilities afforded by Chinese funding, believed that the 
sharing of knowledge and expertise is an important part of the process (Interview, June 2014). 
 Our interviewees were circumspect with regards to the possible constraints facing Chinese 
entry into the Ethiopian NGO sector. As indicated by our interviewees, the negative press 
surrounding Chinese investments in Africa may present problems to Chinese involvement in 
social development. Apart from these general concerns, there were also questions about just how 
Chinese social stakeholders conduct development. For example, the Director of CHF suggested 
that unless Chinese NGOs “come into their own,” then there is potential that they may be like the 
West (Interview, June 2014). The concerns expressed were broad and related to the general 
involvement of the Chinese in Ethiopia from the quality of infrastructure to the Chinese workers 
present in the nation. In the eyes of our NGO interviewees, the possible opportunities presented 
by Chinese social development assistance whether from NGOs or the government would seem to 
outweigh the costs. Furthermore, the representatives noted that Chinese social stakeholders 
would experience more opportunities rather than constraints upon entering Ethiopia, and into 
partnerships with local groups. 
 
The Case of Malawi  
 
Regulatory Environment 
 
 The current robust state of the NGO sector in Malawi obscures a much more complicated 
history that has received only scant attention in the academic literature. A long time civil society 
leader, and now presidential advisor on civil society, Mabvuto Bamusi, notes that Malawi had 
very few local NGOs as recently as 1994 (Interview, June 2014). This was, of course, not for 
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lack of need, but rather constricted political space under post-independence, where the one-party 
rule of Hastings Banda lasted 30 years. Multi-party elections in 1994 heralded a new era, and a 
significant and fast political opening that lead to a boom period for NGOs who generally focused 
on issues such as youth empowerment, human rights, and HIV/AIDS. Although this opening, 
and subsequent growth of the sector, is part attributable to the Western model of development aid 
– notably in a Wilsonian tradition that favours the principal channelling funds through the agent 
(the local civil society organisation) – other observers, such as the representative from the 
Institute for Social Research and Empowerment, a prominent Malawi think tank, contend that the 
new regime purposely created an environment positive for NGO growth in order to display its 
democratic bona fides (Interview, June 2014). 
 Despite early successes for these organisations, the development of NGOs in Malawi has not 
been entirely linear, nor has the relationship of NGOs with the state always been positive. The 
interviewee at the Institute for Social Research and Empowerment describes pendulum-type 
swings in the relationship between the state and NGOs (Interview, June 2014). In 2004, Bingu 
wa Mutharika was elected president in part due to strong support from the increasingly important 
civil society sector. But over his eight year tenure, this relationship became increasingly 
complicated with the president “dividing and ruling” over the large NGO community, favouring 
some while isolating others. Bingu was re-elected in 2009 with a mandate supported by 67% of 
the vote. Civil society actors, once crucial for his support base, were seen as a liability – those 
activists more critical of the government were “beaten up and terrorised”. Indeed, during the last 
three years of Bingu’s rule, NGOs found it difficult to carve out space in the country as they 
were more widely deemed as oppositional forces (Bamusi Interview, June 2014). In essence, 
even though the nation remained at least nominally democratic, the operational and institutional 
environment for NGOs is shaped by the political character of the regime in power at each given 
time – an observation that is generalisable across cases, irrespective of the democratic or non-
democratic nature of the jurisdiction.  
 Even during this more negative period of NGO development in Malawi, activists held a good 
deal of ground, and “did not succumb to government bullying” (Interview with Institute for 
Social Research and Empowerment, June 2014). Indeed, NGOs in Malawi are notable for their 
ability to create both a culture of self-protection, and the institutional structure to back it up. 
Even before the end of one-party rule, a small number of local NGOs created an umbrella 
organisation, the Council for Non-Governmental Organisations in Malawi (CONGOMA). While 
initially founded to protect civil society organisations from the state, its current broader mandate 
is centred on co-ordinating a network of NGOs with the government, identifying gaps in the 
NGO sector, and advocating for a more conducive institutional and regulatory environment for 
NGOs.  
 But CONGOMA’s most interesting, and perhaps most significant function has been its 
central role in writing the nation’s NGO registration law. According to the organization’s leader, 
Ronald Mtonga, a grassroots effort to protect the continuation of political space for NGOs 
quickly took the form of creating a registration law for social organisations (Interview, June 
2014). They sold themselves as an independent body, but perhaps most importantly, one that 
would do all of the work (and cover the costs, which were covered by membership fees of 
registered organisations) of registering and regulating the growing NGO sector in the nation. 
Cleverly, the organisation essentially pre-empted the state in creating a regulatory framework, 
which is a distinct reality both in China and Ethiopia. This makes the regulatory environment in 
Malawi decidedly unique, for it has been the NGO community itself who have written the rules 
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for registration, rather than leaving it in the hands of the government. The effect has been NGOs 
registered in Malawi represent a more “authentic civil society”, without the overt oversight by 
the state.  
 
Opportunities and Constraints 
 
 Although Malawi functions as a reasonably open, liberal democracy, the relationship 
between state and non-state actors is complex. Curled within this complexity between state-NGO 
relations, are similarities with China. Like in China, a large number of the NGOs operating in the 
nation do so as “service providers”. These organisations essentially work at the pleasure of the 
state, and help it govern in areas that it lacks the capacity, time, or political will. It is as service 
providers that most NGOs have enjoyed political space, and economic opportunities, that have 
been fundamental for their individual growth, and the larger development of the NGO sector in 
China (see Hasmath and Hsu 2014; Hsu and Hasmath 2014). Informants who have followed the 
development of local Malawi NGOs (often from the inside) all report a kind of maturation 
wherein the organisations “learn how to behave”. For example, Bamusi suggests that civil 
society has changed fundamentally, not because they have been repressed, but that they can be 
more effective if they are more moderate, “it was previously perhaps too loud, too vocal, and too 
frequently using demonstrations and sit-ins – its actions were more based on emotions” 
(Interview, June 2014). But in the case of China, this is ultimately the only space and role 
available for NGOs, whereas in Malawi there remains what the interviewee of Institute for Social 
Research and Empowerment described as the “100% Western-model type” that conducts 
advocacy and often in an adversarial manner, whereby the NGO “comes into conflict with the 
state more often” (Interview, June 2014). The fact that our Malawian interviewees refer to them 
as a “Western type” of NGOs suggests that, even though they might have some political space to 
operate, unlike in China, this “democratic” environment might well see them as more foreign. 
This suggests that the state will be open to providing more opportunities for those who subscribe 
to a varying partnership/governance model that is commonplace among NGOs operating in 
mainland China.   
 Given the particular strength of Chinese NGOs in the service delivery realm, interviewees 
suggest the possibility for some collaboration in the future. Long-time civil society participants, 
now in government and think tank roles, echoed the potential opportunity for a division of 
labour, with Chinese NGOs engaged in service delivery (which appears to be there comparative 
advantage), with local NGOs focusing on policy advocacy. This would likely mirror the division 
of labour currently between local and international NGOS in the nation. For instance, the head of 
CONGOMA reports that no INGOs conduct human rights or advocacy work, as this is reserved 
for local groups (Interview, June 2014). Yet, the presidential advisor on civil society issues was 
quick to note that if Chinese NGOs came to Malawi they would be “scrutinised on issues of 
transparency and accountability”; another suggested that if Chinese NGOs “displayed difference 
attitudes on democracy [from Malawi NGOs] there would be a problem” (Bamusi Interview, 
June 2014. One interviewee from the Institute of Social Research and Empowerment, who had 
travelled to China several times, wondered out loud if China had any “real” NGOs as all, “their 
closeness to the state is just too much … they lack freedom and so would bring a different 
character of civil society if they came” (Interview, June 2014).  
 As another type of constraint, local NGOs in Malawi (like smaller, less institutionalised 
NGOs in many developing nations) sometimes report feeling overshadowed by larger INGOs – 
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brain drain, resource hoarding, and “capacity sucking”. This led a large number of domestic 
NGOs to boycott all INGO-organised meetings in 2006 (Bamusi Interview, June 2014). The 
NGO-friendly regulatory framework outlined above has sought to address many of these 
concerns. It mandates that INGOs operating in the nation must have a board comprised of at least 
20% locals (Mtonga Interview, June 2014). Although, this has not appeared to scare off many 
Western INGOs, in fact, our interviewees noted that ActionAid has not just met the 20% 
threshold, but created a board of 90% local Malawians – this might well be a constraint to 
Chinese NGOs. That is, if they mirror the Chinese model, they will likely have a majority to all 
staff being Chinese.
2
  
 Additionally, informants all pointed to what they saw as China’s real comparative advantage 
– large infrastructure projects, and their current model of development funding which favours 
no-string loans. China’s development aid is designed solely to be “government to government” 
with no money being funnelled to grassroots civil society organisations (Interview, June 2014). 
With China controlling these purse strings, the Malawi government has little control over where 
the money flows. This makes funding of grassroots NGO projects increasingly difficult with the 
Chinese funding model (Kutengule Interview, June 2014).  
 Furthermore, given that many NGOs work in the field of social development, many in 
Malawi do not believe the Chinese government would be interested in these projects. A Chinese 
embassy official puts it as such: “we prefer the immediacy of government to government 
development … why would we want to resort to using NGOs if we can do the work well 
ourselves” (Interview, June 2014). The qualification here, of course, is if the government is only 
interested in infrastructure development they see little need to enlist the help of their own NGOs. 
However, if the state becomes interested in more social and welfare development projects we 
may we see a window of opportunity for Chinese NGOs to enter Malawi. 
 While the developmental interests of the Chinese government certainly matters, what is to 
stop well-funded Chinese NGOs from entering Malawi independently? It is not just the general 
reluctance or suspect feelings on the part of local civil society actors that gets in the way. Rather, 
the regulatory structure that was created by local NGOs themselves, as described in the previous 
section, which is perhaps the largest impediment for NGO entry in Malawi. The director of 
CONGMA, the independent regulatory board for NGOs, notes that all INGOs operating in the 
nation need to be registered – and he was highly doubtful that Chinese NGOs would be able to 
meet the criteria. Like other interviewees, he noted how Malawi NGOs value both independence 
and internal democracy, noting that registration required that NGOs must have a committee of 
directors that was separate from operations and had 20% Malawi representation; and that these 
organisations could not be formed or administered by the government or GONGOs. This may be 
problematic proposition for Chinese NGOs to achieve (see Hasmath and Hsu 2008). 
 
The Potential Role and Behaviour of Chinese GONGOs 
 
 Interviews with Chinese GONGO representatives emphasised their work in promoting co-
operation, understanding and exchanges with their African counterparts. Although, GONGOs are 
effectively agents of the state, they potentially have an important role to play in international 
development. Notwithstanding, it does appear that their reception by host jurisdictions can be 
                                                 
2
 Several informants in Malawi spoke with a great disdain that the new parliament was built with Chinese funds, and 
had a construction crew that was 100% Chinese nationals. This is an anticipation that Chinese NGOs may follow 
this trend as well. 
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less than rosy, as seen above, GONGOs such as the China NGO Network International Exchange 
(CNNIE), and Beijing NGO Association for International Exchanges (BNAIE), see themselves 
as platforms for promoting cross-cultural learning. As the Secretary of CNNIE noted, her 
organisation is “chiefly a networking platform” (Interview, August 2014). The Deputy Division 
Chief of BNAIE articulates similar organisational aims: “The Beijing NGO Association is 
primarily a networking platform and therefore [we] cooperate with the largest and most 
influential local African NGOs” (Interview, August 2014). While having commensurate goals as 
the previous two organisations, the larger Chinese-African People’s Friendship Association 
(CFPA) works more at the governmental level, thereby reinforcing its GONGO nature. With 
various forums, lectures, study tours and publications, the activities of CFPA are bolstered by its 
co-operation with more 20 Chinese government departments and similar type of organisations in 
Africa, such as the Ghana-China Friendship Association, Association of Local Government 
Authorities of Kenya, or South Africa-China People’s Friendship Association (Interview, August 
2014).  
 The China Youth Development Foundation (CYDF) and China Foundation for Poverty 
Alleviation (CFPA) are slightly different in focus where they are engaged in direct delivery of 
services. CYDF’s China-Africa Hope Project launched in 2011 in Kenya, Burundi and Rwanda 
is its flagship project on the African continent, with the aim of building 1,000 primary schools in 
Africa. A range of Chinese companies have funded CYDF’s project in Africa. CFPA’s current 
focus is in the building of hospitals across Sudan. With a budget of RMB 60 million (USD 9.67 
million), CFPA plans to build 13 hospitals and to train medical staff and provide equipment to 
the hospitals. According to the Chief of Division, CFPA intends to use Sudan as a model to roll 
out similar projects in Ethiopia, Chad, and Kenya (Interview, August 2014). 
 Despite the desire to undertake further projects in Africa, three of the five GONGOs believed 
that having sufficient funding is one of the biggest challenges to their organisation. In particular, 
the Division Director for South and East African Affairs of CFPA noted that in addition to 
funding, she also needed more “people willing to work in Africa, otherwise it will not be 
possible to establish a permanent office there” (Interview, August 2014). For BNAIE, the 
situation is similar – without more funding, it does not have the capacity to establish a permanent 
office in Africa. Chinese GONGO representatives demonstrate that their organisations are at the 
beginning of their social development work in Africa. Despite the enormous commercial 
interests and investments from China, the development sector as represented by the GONGOs, 
do not have sufficient resources to make the social impact that it intends to. 
 
Implications and Conclusion 
 
 The state of the Ethiopian and Malawian NGO sectors suggest that there is both room and 
opportunity for Chinese NGOs to enter both jurisdictions. While Chinese NGOs have not had the 
same history or time in operation as Western NGOs, the experience accumulated within China – 
where development conditions more aptly reflect the recent experiences of Ethiopia and Malawi 
– provide a litany of best/worst practices and lessons learned that can be transferred. Further, 
interviewees in Ethiopia and Malawi noted that Chinese NGOs and social development 
assistance would be a welcomed addition in funding local social programs. The combination of 
expertise and need demonstrate two areas in which Chinese NGOs can capitalise and have a 
comparative advantage, relative to Western NGOs. 
 Having now understood both how Chinese NGOs have developed in their own context, and  
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analysed the domestic conditions that offer both opportunities and constraints for entry into 
Ethiopia and Malawi, we now explore the most likely future scenario. That is, insofar as Chinese 
NGOs continue to mature and follow the developmental and commercial interests of mainland 
China, what might their behaviour look like? Moreover, how should we theorise beyond these 
cases, into other parts of the developing world as China continues to “go out”? 
 First, and perhaps most likely in the immediate term, there will be more of the status quo. As 
has been replicated elsewhere in Africa, we will see more one-off, temporary entry of Chinese 
experts or volunteers. In Ethiopia, while in the field, we were informed of the presence of a large 
team of doctors from the Beijing Eye Hospital who were in the nation to provide “social 
capacity” (non-political action), which basically involved providing short-term surgery for those 
in need. The Economic and Commercial Counsellor based at China’s Embassy in Lilongwe, 
Malawi highlighted one programme of non-state actors – with Chinese government assistance – 
in the form of the China Youth Volunteers who stayed in the nation from 2009 to 2010, and were 
tasked to primarily teach agricultural and computer skills to various government ministries 
(Interview, June 2014). Another observer recalls groups of Chinese dentists that came to the 
nation for three weeks at a time (Bamusi Interview, June 2014). These temporary, project-based 
interventions that, most notably, lack any attempt to institutionalise Chinese social organisations 
in the nation, is a model that widely used in mainland China (see Hasmath and Hsu 2014; Hsu 
and Hasmath 2015).  
 Second, given Beijing’s professed preference of “government to government” linkages in 
development – reinforced by our interviewees – this may suggest a more sustained presence at 
the state-level, without the involvement of independent NGOs, but rather GONGOs. Such future 
GONGO initiatives will likewise have a one-off and ad hoc nature. While such one-off projects 
are easy to control, they lead to a loss of institutional knowledge – which likewise is witnessed in 
the domestic Chinese context (see Hasmath and Hsu 2015b) – and often the solutions are short-
term and temporary and short.  
 Finally, we suspect that the “GONGO-isation of development” may not be a major barrier for 
entry for the Chinese in Ethiopia, largely due to the similarities in the political structure of the 
one-party system. In this system, the state is an unavoidable factor in all aspects of social, 
political and economic development. On the other hand, the regulatory framework governing 
NGOs in places such as Malawi would seem to make life difficult for GONGOs to enter the 
jurisdiction. Chinese NGOs who have a preference for operating in the nation will have to adapt 
by formally distancing themselves from the state, even if informally they are intimately tied. 
While we acknowledge that, at first glance, Chinese GONGOs may not look so different from 
Western NGO
3
 – especially when considering sources of state-NGO funding as a proxy, for 
example, Swedish and Norwegian NGOs receive up to 35% of their finances from their 
respective governments, and Belgian and Irish up to 77% (Bullain 2011: 193) – what is different 
between Chinese GONGOs and their Western counterparts, is as noted previously, Chinese 
GONGOs emerged largely out of the constructs of an authoritarian state. In order to survive and 
flourish in China’s domestic political and institutional environment, Chinese NGOs developed 
adaptive strategies which are now ingrained in their organisational culture and behaviour (see 
Hasmath and Hsu 2015a; Hsu et al, 2015; Hsu and Hasmath 2015). From another standpoint, 
Western NGOs, unlike Chinese NGOs, are generally able to create and implement their 
organisation’s goals and strategies without (real or the threat of) direct government interference 
(McMahon 2002: 30). 
                                                 
3
 We thank the anonymous reviewer and the Editors for bringing this issue to our attention. 
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 Suffice to say, Ethiopia and Malawi highlight some critical areas where Chinese NGOs may 
face entry barriers, but also opportunities to address the development needs in Ethiopia and 
Malawi. Our findings indicate that political regime type whether authoritarian (Ethiopia, sharing 
similarities with China) or democratic (Malawi) will pose a range of future challenges to Chinese 
NGOs. Consequently, we suggest that the authoritarian nature of Ethiopia’s political system is 
unlikely to pose a significant (albeit some) advantage for Chinese NGOs due to the strict 2009 
“Proclamation for the Registration and Regulation of Charities and Societies” (which ironically, 
the Chinese state is currently drafting an even more restrictive regulatory document in this 
fashion than the Ethiopian version). In Malawi, we see challenges of a different kind. Its young 
democracy has presented NGOs the opportunities to assume the role of watchdog of the 
government, and have played an important role in the process of consolidating Malawi’s 
democracy. Thus, Chinese NGOs may have to contend with issues including governance, 
accountability and transparency. The value placed on democratic governance both at the political 
level and for NGOs, as indicated by our interviewees, may prove to be an institutional and 
regulatory challenge for Chinese organisations seeking entry into Malawi. In short, a nation’s 
political regime type can potentially present either an opportunity or constraint for Chinese 
NGOs “going out” in Africa. 
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